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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-2486

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STEVEN TRENK,
President, Gold Crown Insurance Ltd.,
Successor in Interest to Techtron Inc. & Subs.,
Successor in Interest To Techtron Holdings, Inc. & Subs,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01004)
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 30, 2010

Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 01, 2010)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
At issue on this appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Internal

Revenue Service’s (the “IRS”) petition to enforce a summons for the production of
certain documents pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
We will remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to provide appellant
Steven Trenk with an opportunity to argue against the application of the crime-fraud
exception.
BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2005, the IRS issued a summons to Trenk, president of Gold Crown
Insurance, Ltd., the corporate successor to TechTron Holdings, Inc. (“TechTron”), in
furtherance of its examination to determine TechTron’s federal income tax liability for
the taxable year ending December 31, 2000. The IRS alleged that TechTron received
$5.2 million in litigation settlement proceeds, which it transferred to a wholly-owned
subsidiary in exchange for a demand note for $5.2 million from the subsidiary. TechTron
then transferred the demand note to an attorney’s trust account, and on its corporate
income tax return “reported the $5.2 million and deducted $5.2 million, effectively
eliminating” that amount from taxable income. (App. at 59.) The IRS claims that this
was an “abusive tax avoidance scheme” that enabled TechTron to avoid paying taxes on
the settlement proceeds while still maintaining control over those funds. (Id. at 78.) The
summons instructed Trenk to appear for a hearing to give testimony and to produce
various documents and data.
On March 3, 2006, the government filed a petition to enforce the summons. In
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response, Trenk maintained that he was not in possession of any documents responsive to
the summons “with the exception of the [four] documents which are being withheld as
privileged.” (Id. at 120.) He proposed that “the Court review the [four] documents
[being withheld] in camera to determine whether they should be disclosed to the
Government.” (D.N.J. Docket, 06-cv-01004, Doc. No. 9 at 25.) On November 20, 2006,
the District Court enforced the summons. With respect to the four documents withheld
under Trenk’s “blanket assertion” of privilege, App. at 132, it ordered that Trenk “set up
an in camera review of the aforementioned four documents” so that he would be able to
explain ex parte why the documents should not be produced, id. at 132, 147. The Court
added that if he failed to arrange the review, “the opportunity to do so will be deemed
waived, and . . . the Court, on petitioner’s application, will direct that the aforementioned
documents be produced immediately.” (Id. at 147.)
By letter dated December 7, 2006, Trenk’s attorney submitted the four documents
(Documents A-D 1 ) for in camera inspection and referred the District Court to a
previously submitted memorandum setting out Trenk’s arguments why the documents
should not be disclosed. On January 22, 2007, the Court granted Trenk’s partial motion
for reconsideration, thereby reversing its previous order enforcing the summons, but the
effect of that ruling on the Court’s earlier instructions to Trenk to arrange for in camera
review of the four documents was unclear.
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Trenk never arranged for ex parte review, and he maintains that the District Court
never expected that he do so in light of its action on the motion for reconsideration. In
March and April 2007, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to address whether
Trenk was in possession of relevant documents.2 After the first day of the hearing,
Trenk’s attorney identified seven other “privileged documents which may arguably be
within the scope of the summons,” App. at 554, and asked, by letter dated April 20, that
the Court review these documents (Docs. E-K) “in camera along with the original four
documents,” id. at 555. On February 26, 2009, the Court found that the crime-fraud
exception applied to Documents A through K and ordered Trenk to produce them.
DISCUSSION
Trenk timely appealed the District Court’s order with respect to the production of
Documents D through K. He argues that he was denied the opportunity to refute the
application of the crime-fraud exception, and that, in any event, the exception should not
be applied to Documents G, H, I and J, which were prepared after the relevant tax return
was filed.
A.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7604, and our
jurisdiction on appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the legal issues
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Although it was the District Court’s intention to “address all relevant . . . attorneyclient privilege issues” at the hearing, that topic was not explored in detail and the crimefraud exception was not discussed. (App. at 27, 272, 502-05.)
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associated with the application of the crime-fraud exception is plenary, and “[o]nce the
court determines there is sufficient evidence of a crime or fraud to waive the attorneyclient privilege, we review its judgment for abuse of discretion.” In re Impounded, 241
F.3d 308, 312, 318 (3d Cir. 2001).
B.

The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege protects confidences so as to “encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote . . . the
observance of law and administration of justice.” United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
562 (1989) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). Where the
client abuses the privilege by using the attorney’s counsel to facilitate a future or
continuing crime or fraud, however, “the privilege can be overridden.” In re Grand Jury
Investigation, No. 06-1474, 445 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2006). The party seeking to apply
the crime-fraud exception must “make a prima facie showing that (1) the client was
committing or intending to commit a fraud or crime, and (2) the attorney-client
communications were in furtherance of that alleged crime or fraud.” In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
In Zolin, the Supreme Court held that district courts could “conduct an in camera
review of allegedly privileged communications to determine whether those
communications fall within the crime-fraud exception.” 491 U.S. at 565. It explained
that before doing so, “the judge should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to
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support a good faith belief . . . that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence
to establish . . . that the crime-fraud exception applies.” Id. at 572 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). This is not an issue where – as in Trenk’s case – the party invoking
the privilege freely submits the documents for in camera review.
We have subsequently explained, however, that whether to apply the crime-fraud
exception is a separate, more demanding undertaking: “If the party seeking to apply the
exception has made its initial showing, then a more formal procedure is required than that
entitling plaintiff to in camera review.” Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96-97
(3d Cir. 1992). In terms of process, this means that “where a fact finder undertakes to
weigh evidence in a proceeding seeking an exception to the privilege, the party invoking
the privilege has the absolute right to be heard by testimony and argument.” Id. at 97.
C.

The Lack of Hearing

Trenk argues that the District Court erred by not providing him with an
opportunity to address the crime-fraud exception, which the Court applied, without
notice, in its February 26, 2009 order. We agree that although the documents were
properly before the Court for in camera inspection, the Court should not have applied an
exception that “break[s] the seal of a highly protected privilege” without first notifying
Trenk and providing him with an opportunity for argument. See id. at 96.
At first blush, it is tempting to conclude that Trenk had his chance for argument
but waived it. In its November 20, 2006 order, the District Court provided Trenk the
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opportunity to argue ex parte at an in camera hearing why the documents should be
protected from disclosure. It explained that if Trenk did not arrange for in camera
review, the chance to do so would be waived and he would be ordered to produce the
documents. Trenk submitted Documents A through D by letter for the Court to review,
and nothing more. He later sent a second letter, explaining that he found additional
responsive documents, Documents E through K, which he asked that the Court review “in
camera along with the original four documents.” (App. at 555.)
It is not sufficiently clear from the record before us, however, that Trenk had the
opportunity to appear before the District Court ex parte to argue for his position. In
granting Trenk’s partial motion for reconsideration on January 22, 2007, the Court –
reasonably so – appears to have abandoned its initial plan to use in camera review to
decide whether the documents should be produced and, instead, elected to defer ruling on
the issue until after an evidentiary hearing. But the subsequent hearing that took place
was primarily for “the limited purpose of allowing the Court to . . . make an express
determination on whether Trenk was in possession or control of the requested
documents.” (Id. at 27.) The Court then, in its February 26, 2009 order, applied the
crime-fraud exception without having heard from Trenk on the subject. In doing so, “the
party invoking the [attorney-client] privilege,” was denied his “absolute right to be heard
by testimony and argument.” See Haines, 975 F.2d at 97. Although it was assuredly
unintended, this outcome is troubling when dealing, as we are, with an “ancient and
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valuable privilege.” United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2005).
One further point is worth mentioning. It is abundantly clear that between the time
when the District Court first instructed Trenk to arrange for in camera review in its
November 20, 2006 order and when it partially vacated that order on January 22, 2007,
Trenk expected that – even if it were granted – his motion for reconsideration would have
no impact on the Court’s November 20 instructions. His December 7, 2006 letter asking
the Court to review Documents A through D states that “[t]he outcome of the
[reconsideration] motion will have no effect on whether the allegedly privileged
documents should be produced.” (App. at 536.) Rather than arrange to be present for an
in camera review, he quite literally “mailed it in.” It is unclear, however, whether the
Court was under the same impression about the impact of his motion, explaining at a
hearing on March 27, 2007 that “the motion for reconsideration overshadowed” the
privilege dispute and so it “didn’t make the [in camera] review.” (Id. at 272.) Thus, on
this record, we cannot say that Trenk was given the opportunity required by Haines to
argue against the application of the crime-fraud exception. Although the practice of
making documents available for in camera inspection “is well established in the federal
courts,” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 569, it does not deprive the party invoking the privilege of the
opportunity to contest the application of the crime-fraud exception, Haines, 975 F.3d at
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96-97; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 218.3
D.

The Documents Prepared After Filing

Trenk argues that the crime-fraud exception should not apply to those documents –
G, H, I, and J – that were prepared after the relevant tax return was filed, because tax
violations are completed when the contested tax return is filed. The District Court
rejected this argument, finding instead that the alleged fraud was in seeking to avoid
taxation of the settlement not just during the 2000 tax year, but also “in each subsequent
year.” (App. at 30.) In its view, “the fraud alleged . . . is ongoing so long as [TechTron]
avoids paying taxes on the income.” (Id.) We agree; indeed, there is little value in filing
a fraudulent tax return if the impropriety will be disclosed shortly thereafter. We also
agree that the cases Trenk cites – United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222 (1968) and
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) – are distinguishable. In those cases, the
asserted wrongdoing was filing the fraudulent tax returns; however, it is TechTron’s
allegedly on-going efforts to eliminate the litigation settlement from taxable income that
are at issue here. To the extent that the Court, on remand, determines that the crime-fraud
exception applies, Documents G, H, I, and J would not be protected based on the date of
their preparation.
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The government claims that Trenk failed to show that the documents at issue are
privileged. The District Court initially ruled on the crime-fraud exception without
developing this issue, and so we are unable to consider it on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we will remand this matter to the District Court so that
Trenk may have an opportunity to present arguments against the application of the crimefraud exception to Documents D through K.
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